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10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

12 JOHN R. SWITZER, Individually and on) Lead Case No. CGC-18-564904
13 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,) (Consolidated with No. CGC-18-565324)
14 Plaintiff,) CLASS ACTION
15 vs.)
16 W.R. HAMBRECHT & CO., LLC, et al.,) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
17 Defendants.) AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND
APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION

18
19 DATE: March 13, 2020
TIME: 10:30 a.m.
20 DEPT: 613

21 Assigned for all purposes to
22 Judge Teri L. Jackson, Dept. 613
23 Date Action Filed: 03/09/18
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Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

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BY: JUDITH NUNEZ
Deputy Clerk

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs John R. Switzer and Jay Mendelson (“Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives”)
3 respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their motion for final approval of the settlement of
4 this class action on the terms set forth in the Amended Stipulation of Settlement dated August 2, 2019
5 (“Stipulation” or “Settlement”), and for approval of the Plan of Allocation.¹

6 The Settlement provides for the payment by or on behalf of Defendants of the sum of
7 \$2,450,000 for the benefit of the Class.² This Settlement is the culmination of vigorous litigation
8 among the Parties³ for more than a year and a half, and is the product of arm’s-length negotiations
9 between the Parties under the guidance of Michelle Yoshida, Esq., of Phillips ADR, a well-respected
10 and effective mediator of securities class actions. The Settlement resolves all claims against
11 Defendants. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel⁴ believe that the Settlement represents a very favorable result
12 for the Class and militates in favor of Court approval.

13 As further discussed below, the Settlement should be presumed fair because it was reached in
14 good faith through arm’s-length bargaining, and Class Counsel’s investigation and prosecution of the
15 case assured that Plaintiffs entered into the Settlement on a fully informed basis. Class Counsel are
16
17

18 ¹ Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms shall have the same meanings ascribed to
19 them in the Stipulation. Citations to the Stipulation are in the form “Stip., ¶__.

20 ² “Class” or “Class Members” means all Persons who purchased Arcimoto common stock in
21 Arcimoto’s IPO between June 22, 2017 and September 21, 2017. Excluded from the Class are
22 Defendants and their families, the officers, directors and affiliates of Defendants at all relevant times,
23 members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and
24 any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling ownership interest during the Class Period;
25 and any Person who timely and validly requests exclusion from the Class.

26 ³ “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs, on the one hand, Arcimoto, Inc. (“Arcimoto” or the “Company”),
27 Mark Frohnmayer, Douglas M. Campoli, Thomas Thurston, Terry Becker, and Jefferson Curl (the
28 “Individual Defendants,” and collectively with Arcimoto, the “Arcimoto Defendants”), and W.R.
Hambrecht + Co., LLC (the “Underwriter Defendant” or “Hambrecht,” and together with the Arcimoto
Defendants, “Defendants”), on the other hand.

⁴ Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP (“Robbins Geller”) and Johnson Fistel, LLP (“Johnson
Fistel”) were appointed by the Court as Class Counsel in the Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, dated August 9, 2019 (the “Preliminary Approval
Order”).

1 experienced in securities class action litigation, and following a thorough Court-approved notice
2 program, to date, there have been no objections to the Settlement or Plan of Allocation.⁵

3 There is nothing to rebut that presumption. While Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that the
4 litigation has substantial merit and they would have ultimately prevailed at trial, they considered the
5 numerous arguments made by Defendants during the case and in settlement negotiations, as well as the
6 risk of being unable to establish liability and damages at trial. Indeed, at trial, the jury could have sided
7 with Defendants on some or all of the determinative issues, leaving the Class with little or no recovery
8 whatsoever.

9 Class Counsel, who are both well-respected firms that have substantial experience in
10 prosecuting shareholder class actions, have concluded that the Settlement is an excellent result that is in
11 the best interest of the Class. This conclusion is based on, among other things, the substantial recovery
12 obtained through the Settlement when weighed against the significant risk, expense, and delay
13 presented in continuing this litigation through trial and probable appeal; a complete analysis of the
14 evidence obtained; Class Counsel's considerable experience in litigating complex actions similar to the
15 present action; and the serious disputes among the Parties on both merits and damages issues.

16 For these and other reasons set forth below, as well as those set forth in the previously-filed
17 Joint Declaration of James I. Jaconette and Phong L. Tran in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
18 for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (the "Joint Declaration," or "Joint Decl."),⁶
19 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval to the Settlement and approve the Plan
20 of Allocation as fair, reasonable, and adequate to Class Members.⁷

21 _____
22 ⁵ The objection deadline is January 6, 2020. *See* Preliminary Approval Order, ¶22. Should any
23 objections be received by that date, Class Counsel will address them in a supplemental memorandum,
which is due no later than February 20, 2020. *Id.*

24 ⁶ The Joint Declaration details Plaintiffs' claims, the procedural history of the litigation, the efforts of
25 Class Counsel in prosecuting the case, the risks of continued litigation, and why the Settlement is in the
best interests of the Class.

26 ⁷ This memorandum focuses primarily upon the legal standards for approving the Settlement, and
27 evaluating the Plan of Allocation. A separate memorandum is being submitted herewith in support of
the motion for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses. For a complete factual recitation, Class
Counsel respectfully refer the Court to the Joint Declaration, incorporated by reference herein.

1 **II. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE AND**
2 **WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL**

3 **A. Standards Governing Final Approval of Class Action Settlements**

4 “A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval of the
5 court.” Cal. Civ. Code §1781(f). When assessing a proposed class action settlement, the court’s
6 inquiry centers on whether the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
7 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996).⁸ The inquiry ““must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a
8 reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion
9 between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and
10 adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*; *see also In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006)
11 (same).

12 Accordingly, the Court need not inquire into the possible result that might have been obtained at
13 trial. *See Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed
14 settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
15 achieved had plaintiffs prevailed at trial.”). A review of the likely rewards of settlement and the risks
16 and costs of continued litigation suffices. *See North Cnty. Contractor’s Ass’n v. Touchstone Ins. Servs.*,
17 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1091 (1994) (court must determine if settlement is in the “ballpark”). “In most
18 situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are preferable to
19 lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV,*
20 *Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004).⁹ Further, longstanding public policy strongly favors
21 settlements. *See, e.g., Hamilton v. Oakland Sch. Dist.*, 219 Cal. 322, 329 (1933) (“[I]t is the policy of
22 the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromises.”). This policy becomes an “overriding
23 public interest” in class actions. *Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co.*, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1589, 1608 (1991).

24 In determining whether a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, there is a “presumption of
25 fairness” where, as here: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2)

26 ⁸ Unless otherwise noted, citations are omitted throughout.

27 ⁹ California courts often look to the standards developed by federal courts in reviewing and approving
28 class action settlements. *See, e.g., La Sala v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 872 (1971).

1 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel
2 is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App.
3 4th at 1802; *see also Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2009) (same).

4 The court in *Dunk* also set forth additional factors that may be considered along with this
5 presumption, including: (1) the settlement amount; (2) the risks of continued litigation; (3) the stage of
6 proceedings; (4) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation absent settlement; (5) the
7 experience and views of class counsel; and (6) the reaction of class members. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal. App.
8 4th at 1801; *see also In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 723 (same).

9 As discussed below, the Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness, and the application
10 of the additional *Dunk* factors further confirms that final approval should be granted.

11 **B. The Settlement Should be Accorded a Presumption of Fairness**

12 The Settlement is presumptively fair under the standard articulated in *Dunk*.

13 *First*, the Parties negotiated the Settlement in good-faith and at arm’s-length under the
14 supervision of Michelle Yoshida, Esq., of Phillips ADR, a well-regarded and experienced mediator in
15 cases like this. *See Sudunagunta v. NantKwest, Inc.*, No. CV 16-1947-MWF (JEMx), 2019 WL
16 2183451, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2019) (in granting final approval of a securities class action
17 settlement, court found that “[t]he assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process
18 confirms that the settlement is non-collusive”). These negotiations included a day-long, in-person
19 mediation session during which the Parties’ positions on merits and damages issues were discussed, as
20 well as extensive follow-up negotiations, all of which were informed by detailed mediation briefs and
21 supporting materials exchanged in advance of the negotiations. *See Joint Decl.*, ¶¶6(q)-(r), 36-39.
22 During these settlement negotiations, the strengths and weaknesses of the Parties’ respective claims and
23 defenses were fully explored as Ms. Yoshida challenged both sides’ positions. *Id.*, ¶37.

24 *Second*, the Parties engaged in extensive pretrial investigation and discovery and other
25 proceedings to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses, and therefore entered
26 into the Settlement on an informed basis. Class Counsel, among other things:

- 27 (i) conducted an extensive factual investigation of the events underlying Arcimoto’s
28 September 21, 2017 Offering;

- 1 (ii) reviewed and analyzed the representations made by the Company in the Prospectus, as
2 well as in subsequent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings;
- 3 (iii) reviewed and analyzed the representations made by Defendants in the IPO roadshow
4 videos;
- 5 (iv) reviewed and analyzed industry and securities analyst reports, comprehensive news
6 reports, press releases, and other media files concerning Arcimoto;
- 7 (v) reviewed and analyzed witness accounts of Arcimoto’s operations provided by former
8 Arcimoto employees, which were developed through counsel’s investigation;
- 9 (vi) researched and filed multiple complaints, including the operative Complaint;
- 10 (vii) briefed, argued, and successfully opposed, in part, the demurrers brought by Defendants
11 to the Consolidated Complaint;
- 12 (viii) briefed, argued and successfully opposed Defendants’ motion to stay further discovery
13 pending ruling on demurrer;
- 14 (ix) negotiated, prepared and filed the stipulation consolidating and coordinating the related
15 actions;
- 16 (x) prepared and filed initial and updated joint case management conference statements
17 addressing the status of discovery and the scheduling of pre-trial matters;
- 18 (xi) prepared and propounded written discovery on Defendants, including special
19 interrogatories and document requests;
- 20 (xii) met and conferred with Defendants over the discovery requests;
- 21 (xiii) reviewed and drafted responses and objections to the discovery requests propounded on
22 Plaintiffs;
- 23 (xiv) obtained and reviewed over 107,000 pages of document discovery produced by
24 Arcimoto and Hambrecht;
- 25 (xv) reviewed and produced documents on behalf of Plaintiffs in response to Defendants’
26 discovery requests;
- 27 (xvi) retained and consulted with a damages consultant regarding the calculation of damages
28 under the 1933 Act;
- (xvii) prepared and submitted detailed mediation statements prior to the mediation with
Ms. Yoshida; and
- (xviii) prepared for and participated in a day-long mediation session with Michelle Yoshida,
Esq. of Phillips ADR on January 25, 2019, which culminated in a cash Settlement
Amount of \$2,450,000 and other favorable settlement terms for the Class.

1 See Joint Decl., ¶¶6(a)-(s), 31-39. Given these substantial efforts, Class Counsel were in an optimal
2 position to negotiate the Settlement based on an informed evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of
3 the claims asserted, the defenses raised, and the risks of continued litigation. *Id.*, ¶¶31, 37, 42.

4 **Third**, although the Court has an obligation to independently review the Settlement, the
5 judgment of experienced counsel regarding the Settlement is entitled to great weight and supports a
6 presumption of fairness. See *Nat'l Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 528 (“Great weight is accorded to the
7 recommendation of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying
8 litigation”); *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802. Class Counsel here – the firms of Robbins Geller and
9 Johnson Fistel – have extensive experience and expertise in the prosecution of securities class actions in
10 federal and state courts throughout the country. See Exhibit G to the accompanying Declaration of
11 James I. Jaconette Filed on Behalf of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP and Exhibit F to the
12 accompanying Declaration of Frank J. Johnson Filed on Behalf of Johnson Fistel, LLP in Support of
13 Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (Firm Resumes of Robbins Geller and Johnson
14 Fistel). Likewise, counsel for plaintiff Jay Mendelson, Robbins LLP,¹⁰ also has considerable
15 experience in prosecuting securities class actions such as this. See Exhibit F to the accompanying
16 Declaration of Stephen J. Oddo Filed on Behalf of Robbins LLP in Support of Application for Award of
17 Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (Firm Resume of Robbins LLP). Class Counsel, along with Robbins
18 LLP, fully support the Settlement, and believe that the substantial and certain recovery of \$2,450,000 is
19 a highly favorable result for the Class when weighed against the uncertainty and substantial risk and
20 expense of continuing this litigation through trial and appeals. Joint Decl., ¶¶8-12, 42-45. The fact that
21 qualified and well-informed counsel endorse the Settlement as being fair, adequate, and reasonable
22 favors this Court’s approval of the Settlement.

23 **Fourth**, the reaction of the Class to the Settlement supports a presumption of fairness. Pursuant
24 to the Preliminary Approval Order, more than 6,900 copies of the Notice of Proposed Class Action
25 Settlement (“Notice”) were sent to potential Class Members and their nominees. See Declaration of
26 Mishka Ferguson Regarding Notice Dissemination, Publication, and Requests for Exclusion Received

27 ¹⁰ Robbins LLP was previously known as Robbins Arroyo LLP.

1 to Date (“Mailing Decl.”), ¶¶4-12, submitted herewith. The Notice described the nature of the
2 litigation, the terms of the Settlement, and the manner in which the Net Settlement Fund will be
3 allocated among Class Members. The Notice also advised Class Members of their right to object and
4 the procedures and deadline for objecting to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, or counsel’s request
5 for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. In addition, the Summary Notice was transmitted over
6 *Business Wire* and published in *The Wall Street Journal* on September 12, 2019. *Id.*, ¶13. The Notice,
7 Stipulation, and other relevant documents and information, including all deadlines, were also made
8 publicly available on a case-dedicated website for the Settlement,
9 www.arcimotosecuritieslitigation.com. *Id.*, ¶15.

10 Although Class Members have until January 6, 2020 to object or exclude themselves from the
11 Class, Class Counsel are not aware of any objections to the Settlement or the Plan of Allocation as of
12 the date hereof. Only two requests for exclusion have been submitted. *See id.*, ¶16 (two requests for
13 exclusions to date). The lack of objections and minimal requests for exclusion by the Class to date
14 supports a presumption of fairness.¹¹ *See 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp*, 85
15 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1153 (2000) (one factor that “lead[s] to a presumption the settlement was fair” is
16 that only “a small percentage of objectors” came forward); *Nat’l Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 529 (small
17 number of objections raises strong presumption that settlement is fair).

18 Based on the foregoing, the Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness under *Dunk*.

19 **C. The Settlement Satisfies the Additional *Dunk* Factors**

20 In addition, each of the *Dunk* factors supports a finding that the Settlement is fair, reasonable
21 and adequate, and deserving of final approval.

22 **1. The Amount of the Settlement Balanced Against the Strength of**
23 **Plaintiffs’ Case Favors Approval**

24 Under the Settlement, Defendants have paid or caused to be paid \$2,450,000 in cash for the
25 benefit of the Class. This \$2,450,000 Settlement, if approved, would be significantly above the range of
26

27 ¹¹ If any objections are received, Plaintiffs will address them in a supplemental memorandum to be
28 filed on February 20, 2020. *See Preliminary Approval Order*, ¶22.

1 settlements in recent years in class actions asserting federal statutory claims under the Securities Act for
2 alleged material misstatements in the offering documents for a public stock offering.

3 Based on the assumption that Plaintiffs would meet their burden of proof and persuade the jury
4 at trial as to each element of their prima facie claims, and that Plaintiffs would successfully rebut every
5 affirmative defense Defendants intended to establish, maximum estimated damages could reach as high
6 as \$7.75 million. *See* Declaration of Bjorn I. Steinholt, dated June 24, 2019, ¶12, attached as Exhibit 1
7 to the accompanying Declaration of Ellen Gusikoff Stewart in Support of Motion for: (1) Final
8 Approval of Class Action Settlement and Approval of Plan of Allocation; and (2) an Award of
9 Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. Accordingly, the percentage of recovery of Plaintiffs’ maximum
10 estimated damages is approximately 31.6% – well above the median settlement as a percentage of
11 estimated damages that courts have approved in cases only involving Securities Act claims. *See*
12 Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, *Securities Class Action Settlements – 2018*
13 *Review and Analysis* at 7, Fig. 6 (Cornerstone Research 2019) (analyzing 76 class action settlements
14 asserting §§ 11 and/or 12(a)(2) claims from between 2009 and 2018, and finding the median settlement
15 as a percentage of “simplified statutory damages” was 8%).¹² *See also* Stefan Boettrich and Svetlana
16 Starykh, *Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2018 Full-Year Review* at 35, Fig. 27
17 (NERA 2019) (median settlement value as a percentage of investor losses in cases where damages are
18 less than \$20 million is 19.4%). Not surprisingly, Defendants estimated damages at a fraction of the
19 amount estimated by Plaintiffs’ expert.

20 This Settlement is unquestionably better than another possibility – little or no recovery at all in
21 view of the risks of continued litigation, discussed below. *See Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 250
22 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if ‘the relief afforded by the
23 proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully
24 litigated,’ this is no bar to a class settlement because ‘the public interest may indeed be served by a
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26 _____
27 ¹² The Cornerstone Research report is available online at:
28 <https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2018-Review-and-Analysis>.

1 voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”(‘). This
2 factor supports final approval of the Settlement.

3 **2. The Substantial Risks of Continued Litigation**

4 While Plaintiffs believe their claims are strong on the merits, the ultimate success of Plaintiffs’
5 case, through trial and any appeal, was hardly assured. Plaintiffs alleged that Arcimoto’s Registration
6 Statement, Prospectus and certain videos used in connection with the IPO roadshow (collectively, the
7 “Offering Materials”) contained materially false and misleading statements and omitted material
8 adverse information about the Company’s business operations and financial prospects. Joint Decl.,
9 ¶¶5, 20-21. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that the Offering Materials misrepresented and omitted
10 material facts concerning Arcimoto’s then-existing production capabilities at the time of the IPO, its
11 ability to deliver properly-functioning “SRK” electric vehicles to customers, and the purported “street
12 legal” status of the SRKs. *Id.* Defendants have and would continue to maintain that Plaintiffs cannot
13 demonstrate the materiality or falsity of any of the challenged statements in the Offering Materials, and
14 that all appropriate risk warnings were made. *Id.*, ¶¶8, 25, 44. Moreover, it is likely that Defendants
15 would have asserted a “negative causation” defense at summary judgment and trial, by which they
16 would argue that the decline in Arcimoto common stock price after its IPO was not attributable to any
17 omission or misrepresentation in the Offering Materials, but was simply consistent with overall market
18 conditions or other reasons unrelated to the alleged misstatements and omissions. *Id.*, ¶45. While
19 Plaintiffs have substantial responses to these arguments, the uncertainty of continued litigation weighs
20 strongly in favor of approval of the Settlement. As one court has observed:

21 It is known from past experience that no matter how confident one may be of the outcome of
22 litigation, such confidence is often misplaced. Merely by way of example, two instances in this Court
23 may be cited where offers of settlement were rejected by some plaintiffs and were disapproved by this
24 Court. The trial in each case then resulted unfavorably for plaintiffs; in one case they recovered nothing
25 and in the other they recovered less than the amount which had been offered in settlement.

26 *W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 314 F. Supp. 710, 743-744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), *aff’d*, 440 F.2d 1079
27 (2d Cir. 1971); *see also Bellows v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:07-cv-01413-W-AJB, 2008 WL 5458986,

1 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008) (“[W]hile Class Counsel believe strongly in the merit of the class
2 claims, they also recognize that any case encompasses risks and that settlement of contested cases is
3 preferred in this circuit. Indeed, even if Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, risks to the class remain.”); *In*
4 *re Heritage Bond Litig.*, No. 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 WL 1594403, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005)
5 (“Also favoring approval of the Settlement is the knowledge that, while Plaintiffs are confident of the
6 strength of their case, it is imprudent to presume ultimate success at trial and thereafter.”) (both citing
7 *Chas. Pfizer*, 314 F. Supp. at 743-744). The numerous uncertainties and risks of proving liability at and
8 after trial support approval of the Settlement.

9 **3. Risks Relating to Establishing Damages**

10 Although Plaintiffs were confident that they could establish damages assuming a finding of
11 liability, Plaintiffs faced a risk that the Court or jury would substantially reduce or even eliminate
12 damages altogether. *See* Joint Decl., ¶45. Under §11(e) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k(e), a
13 defendant can reduce or eliminate damages through a showing that the false or misleading statements or
14 omissions alleged were not the cause, in whole or in part, of the loss sustained by the class. As noted
15 above, Defendants would likely argue “negative causation” at both summary judgment and trial. The
16 Parties’ respective experts therefore would offer sharply divergent testimony concerning damages at
17 both summary judgment and trial, reducing the determination of this element to a highly-contested
18 “battle of the experts.” *See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260-61 (D.N.H. 2007) (fact that
19 “trial would likely involve a confusing ‘battle of the experts’ over damages” supported approval of
20 settlement); *see also* Joint Decl., ¶¶41, 45. Plaintiffs faced a substantial risk that the factfinder would
21 credit Defendants’ defense that damages were not linked to the misstatements in the offering documents
22 or that damages were a fraction of the amount Plaintiffs proffered. *See In re Warner Commc ‘ns Sec.*
23 *Litig.*, 618 F. Supp. 735, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (approving settlement where “it is virtually
24 impossible to predict with any certainty which testimony would be credited, and ultimately, which
25 damages would be found to have been caused by actionable, rather than the myriad nonactionable
26 factors such as general market conditions”), *aff’d*, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).

1 Even if Plaintiffs were to obtain 100% of their damages, the risks would not end there. *See In re*
2 *Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig.*, MDL No. 1109, 1998 WL 1993385, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1998)
3 (“[E]ven if it is assumed that a successful outcome for plaintiffs at summary judgment or at trial would
4 yield a greater recovery than the Settlement – which is not at all apparent – there is easily enough
5 uncertainty in the mix to support settling the dispute rather than risking no recovery in future
6 proceedings.”). Indeed, there are numerous cases in which a successful verdict has been overturned
7 either by motion after trial or an appeal. For example, in *In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.*, No. C-84-
8 20148(A)-JW, 1991 WL 238298, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1991), the jury rendered a verdict for
9 plaintiffs after an extended trial. Based upon the jury’s findings, recoverable damages would have
10 exceeded \$100 million. The court, however, overturned the verdict, entered judgment for the individual
11 defendants, and ordered a new trial with respect to the corporate defendant. *See also e.g., Glickenhau*
12 *& Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc.*, 787 F.3d 408, 433 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding jury verdict
13 of \$2.46 billion after 13 years of litigation on loss causation grounds and error injury instruction under
14 *Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders*, 564 U.S. 135 (2011)); *In re BankAtlantic Bancorp,*
15 *Sec. Litig.*, No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *20 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011) (after plaintiffs’
16 jury verdict, court granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment for
17 defendants), *aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.*, 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012)
18 (finding trial court erred, but defendants nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on
19 lack of loss causation); *see also* Joint Decl., ¶46. The substantial litigation risks on the issues of
20 liability and damages support approval of the Settlement.

21 **4. Plaintiffs Had Sufficient Information to Negotiate and Obtain a**
22 **Fair Settlement**

23 This factor focuses on whether the Parties had sufficient information to conduct an informed
24 negotiation for a settlement that adequately reflects the merits of the case.

25 As detailed above, when the Parties reached the Settlement, Class Counsel had sufficiently
26 investigated and researched the merits of their claims and Defendants’ potential defenses to determine
27 that the terms of the Settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the Class.
28 Class Counsel’s reasoned judgment was obtained after more than a year and a half of hard-fought

1 litigation, during which they briefed demurrers and a motion to stay the proceedings; propounded
2 multiple sets of written discovery requests on each Defendant group; reviewed over 107,000 pages of
3 documents; consulted with a damages expert; and participated in mediated settlement negotiations
4 during which the strengths and weaknesses of the Parties' positions were fully explored and debated.
5 *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶6, 31-35. The knowledge and insight gained through these activities provided Class
6 Counsel with sufficient information to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Class's claims and
7 Defendants' defenses, as well as the likelihood of obtaining a potentially larger recovery from
8 Defendants had the litigation continued.

9 It bears noting that class action settlements are regularly approved after having completed
10 similar or less discovery than that completed here. *See, e.g., Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of*
11 *Los Angeles*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 403 (2010) (final approval of class action affirmed when no
12 depositions had been taken, just written discovery completed). This factor weighs significantly in favor
13 of approval.

14 **5. Balancing the Certainty of an Immediate Recovery Against the**
15 **Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Continued**
Litigation and Trial Favors Settlement

16 The immediacy and certainty of a recovery balanced against the complexity, expense, and
17 duration of continued litigation is another factor for the Court to balance in determining whether the
18 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *See Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 244-245; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.
19 App. 4th at 1801. The benefit of the present settlement must be balanced against the expense of
20 achieving a more favorable result at a trial in the future. Approval of the Settlement assures a prompt
21 and significant recovery for Class Members. If not for the Settlement, this litigation would continue to
22 proceed through the completion of document and deposition discovery, expert discovery, summary
23 judgment, trial, and likely appeal. A trial would occupy teams of attorneys for weeks and would require
24 substantial and costly expert testimony on both sides. Further, a judgment favorable to the Class, in
25 light of the contested nature of virtually every aspect of this case, would unquestionably be the subject
26 of post-trial motions and appeals, which would prolong the case for several more years. *See Warner*
27 *Comm'ns.*, 618 F. Supp. at 745 (delay from appeals is factor to be considered). Delay, not just at the
28

1 trial stage, but through post-trial motions and the appellate process as well, could force Class Members
2 to wait many more years for any recovery, further reducing its value. Settlement of this litigation
3 ensures an immediate recovery, and eliminates the risk of no recovery at all. The essence of a
4 settlement is compromise, “a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.” *Officers for*
5 *Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). “[T]he agreement reached normally
6 embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give
7 up something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation.” *Id.* The certainty of recovery
8 balanced against the complexity, expense, and duration of continued litigation weighs in favor of
9 approval of the Settlement. *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶8, 46-47.

10 **6. The Recommendation of Experienced Counsel Favor Approval of**
11 **the Settlement**

12 The views of the attorneys actively conducting the litigation, while not conclusive, are entitled
13 to great weight in the fairness analysis. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802; *see also In re Omnivision*
14 *Techs.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel
15 should be given a presumption of reasonableness.”). “This is because parties represented by competent
16 counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s
17 expected outcome in the litigation.” *See Nat’l Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 528. Class Counsel here have a
18 strong track record of successfully prosecuting securities class actions like this one, and their
19 endorsement of the Settlement as being in the best interests of the Class therefore weighs strongly in
20 favor of approval.¹³ *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶12, 47.

21 In sum, because each of the *Dunk* factors supports a finding that the Settlement is fair,
22 reasonable, and adequate, the Court should approve the Settlement.
23
24
25

26 ¹³ The reaction of the Class is also relevant to the fairness of the Settlement. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal. App.
27 4th at 1801. As noted above, there have been no objections and only two opt-outs to date. If any timely
28 objections are submitted, Plaintiffs will address them in a supplemental memorandum. *See* note 11,
supra.

1 **III. THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD**
2 **BE APPROVED**

3 Plaintiffs also seek approval of the Plan of Allocation. The Plan of Allocation is set forth in full
4 in the Notice mailed to potential Class Members. *See* Mailing Decl., Ex. A, Notice at 3-5. Assessment
5 of a plan of allocation in a class action is governed by the same standards of review applicable to the
6 settlement as a whole – the plan must be fair and reasonable. *See Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955 F.2d
7 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 1992). An allocation formula “need only have a reasonable, rational basis,
8 particularly if recommended by experienced and competent” class counsel. *See, e.g., In re Zynga Sec.*
9 *Litig.*, No. 12-cv-04007-JSC, 2015 WL 6471171, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015).

10 The Plan of Allocation provides an equitable basis to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among
11 all Class Members who submit an acceptable Proof of Claim. The Plan of Allocation was developed by
12 Class Counsel with the assistance of their damages consultant, reflects an assessment of the damages
13 that could have been recovered at trial and follows the statutory framework for calculating damages
14 under §11(e) of the Securities Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Plan of
15 Allocation is a fair and reasonable method for allocating the Net Settlement Fund among the members
16 of the Class. Notably, no objections to the Plan of Allocation have been filed to date.

17 **IV. CONCLUSION**

18 The Settlement reached by Class Counsel is a very good one, and for the foregoing reasons,
19 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval to the Settlement, approve the Plan of
20 Allocation, and enter the proposed Judgment and Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action
21 Settlement and Approving the Plan of Allocation.

22 DATED: December 23, 2019

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL AND EMAIL

I, the undersigned, declare:

1. That declarant is and was, at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of San Diego, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to or interested party in the within action; that declarant's business address is 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900, San Diego, California 92101.

2. That on December 23, 2019, declarant served the PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION by depositing a true copy thereof in a United States mailbox at San Diego, California in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid and addressed to the parties listed on the attached Service List.

3. That there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the places so addressed.

4. This document was also served via email on all parties listed on the attached Service List.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 23, 2019, at San Diego, California.


JACLYN WILLIAMS

SERVICE LIST

Switzer v. W.R. Hambrecht & Co., LLC, Lead Case No. CGC-18-564904 (Super. Ct., S.F. Cty.)
(Consolidated with No. CGC-18-565324)

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